• Je něco špatně v tomto záznamu ?

Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games

V. Křivan, TE. Galanthay, R. Cressman,

. 2018 ; 455 (-) : 232-248. [pub] 20180707

Jazyk angličtina Země Velká Británie

Typ dokumentu časopisecké články, práce podpořená grantem

Perzistentní odkaz   https://www.medvik.cz/link/bmc19045381

Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk-Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (which is a proxy of the per capita population growth rate) in pair-wise contests only. These models assume that the equilibrium distribution of phenotypes involved (e.g., Hawks and Doves) in the population is given by the Hardy-Weinberg law, which is based on instantaneous, random pair formation. On the other hand, models of population dynamics do not consider pairs, newborns are produced by singles, and interactions between phenotypes or species are described by the mass action principle. This article links game theoretic and population approaches. It shows that combining distribution dynamics with population dynamics can lead to stable coexistence of Hawk and Dove population numbers in models that do not assume a priori that fitness is negative density dependent. Our analysis shows clearly that the interior Nash equilibrium of the Hawk and Dove model depends both on population size and on interaction times between different phenotypes in the population. This raises the question of the applicability of classic evolutionary game theory that requires all interactions take the same amount of time and that all single individuals have the same payoff per unit of time, to real populations. Furthermore, by separating individual fitness into birth and death effects on singles and pairs, it is shown that stable coexistence in these models depends on the time-scale of the distribution dynamics relative to the population dynamics. When explicit density-dependent fitness is included through competition over a limited resource, the combined dynamics of the Hawk-Dove model often lead to Dove extinction no matter how costly fighting is for Hawk pairs.

Citace poskytuje Crossref.org

000      
00000naa a2200000 a 4500
001      
bmc19045381
003      
CZ-PrNML
005      
20200115091639.0
007      
ta
008      
200109s2018 xxk f 000 0|eng||
009      
AR
024    7_
$a 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.07.003 $2 doi
035    __
$a (PubMed)29990466
040    __
$a ABA008 $b cze $d ABA008 $e AACR2
041    0_
$a eng
044    __
$a xxk
100    1_
$a Křivan, Vlastimil $u Czech Academy of Sciences, Biology Centre, Institute of Entomology, Branišovská 31, České Budějovice 370 05, Czech Republic; Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Sciences, University of South Bohemia, Branišovská 1760, České Budějovice 370 05, Czech Republic. Electronic address: vlastimil.krivan@gmail.com.
245    10
$a Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games / $c V. Křivan, TE. Galanthay, R. Cressman,
520    9_
$a Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk-Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (which is a proxy of the per capita population growth rate) in pair-wise contests only. These models assume that the equilibrium distribution of phenotypes involved (e.g., Hawks and Doves) in the population is given by the Hardy-Weinberg law, which is based on instantaneous, random pair formation. On the other hand, models of population dynamics do not consider pairs, newborns are produced by singles, and interactions between phenotypes or species are described by the mass action principle. This article links game theoretic and population approaches. It shows that combining distribution dynamics with population dynamics can lead to stable coexistence of Hawk and Dove population numbers in models that do not assume a priori that fitness is negative density dependent. Our analysis shows clearly that the interior Nash equilibrium of the Hawk and Dove model depends both on population size and on interaction times between different phenotypes in the population. This raises the question of the applicability of classic evolutionary game theory that requires all interactions take the same amount of time and that all single individuals have the same payoff per unit of time, to real populations. Furthermore, by separating individual fitness into birth and death effects on singles and pairs, it is shown that stable coexistence in these models depends on the time-scale of the distribution dynamics relative to the population dynamics. When explicit density-dependent fitness is included through competition over a limited resource, the combined dynamics of the Hawk-Dove model often lead to Dove extinction no matter how costly fighting is for Hawk pairs.
650    12
$a biologická evoluce $7 D005075
650    _2
$a teorie her $7 D005716
650    12
$a biologické modely $7 D008954
650    _2
$a populační dynamika $7 D011157
655    _2
$a časopisecké články $7 D016428
655    _2
$a práce podpořená grantem $7 D013485
700    1_
$a Galanthay, Theodore E $u Department of Mathematics, Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY, USA. Electronic address: tgalanthay@ithaca.edu.
700    1_
$a Cressman, Ross $u Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Electronic address: rcressman@wlu.ca.
773    0_
$w MED00003018 $t Journal of theoretical biology $x 1095-8541 $g Roč. 455, č. - (2018), s. 232-248
856    41
$u https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29990466 $y Pubmed
910    __
$a ABA008 $b sig $c sign $y a $z 0
990    __
$a 20200109 $b ABA008
991    __
$a 20200115092013 $b ABA008
999    __
$a ok $b bmc $g 1483650 $s 1084054
BAS    __
$a 3
BAS    __
$a PreBMC
BMC    __
$a 2018 $b 455 $c - $d 232-248 $e 20180707 $i 1095-8541 $m Journal of theoretical biology $n J Theor Biol $x MED00003018
LZP    __
$a Pubmed-20200109

Najít záznam

Citační ukazatele

Nahrávání dat ...

Možnosti archivace

Nahrávání dat ...