-
Something wrong with this record ?
Justine effect: punishment of the unduly self-sacrificing cooperative individuals
AA. Kuběna, P. Houdek, J. Lindová, L. Příplatová, J. Flegr,
Language English Country United States
Document type Journal Article, Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
NLK
Directory of Open Access Journals
from 2006
Free Medical Journals
from 2006
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
from 2006
PubMed Central
from 2006
Europe PubMed Central
from 2006
ProQuest Central
from 2006-12-01
Open Access Digital Library
from 2006-01-01
Open Access Digital Library
from 2006-10-01
Open Access Digital Library
from 2006-01-01
Medline Complete (EBSCOhost)
from 2008-01-01
Nursing & Allied Health Database (ProQuest)
from 2006-12-01
Health & Medicine (ProQuest)
from 2006-12-01
Public Health Database (ProQuest)
from 2006-12-01
ROAD: Directory of Open Access Scholarly Resources
from 2006
- MeSH
- Altruism * MeSH
- Cooperative Behavior * MeSH
- Humans MeSH
- Social Justice * MeSH
- Game Theory MeSH
- Punishment * MeSH
- Check Tag
- Humans MeSH
- Publication type
- Journal Article MeSH
- Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't MeSH
BACKGROUND: Allowing players to punish their opponents in Public Goods Game sustains cooperation within a group and thus brings advantage to the cooperative individuals. However, the possibility of punishment of the co-players can result in antisocial punishment, the punishment of those players who contribute the most in the group. To better understand why antisocial punishment exists, it must be determined who are the anti-social punishers and who are their primary targets. METHODS: For resolving these questions we increased the number of players in a group from usual four to twelve. Each group played six rounds of the standard Public Goods Game and six rounds of the Public Goods Game with punishment. Each player in each round received 20 CZK ($ 1.25). Players (N = 118) were rematched after each round so that they would not take into consideration opponents' past behavior. RESULTS: The amount of the punishment received correlated negatively with the contribution (ρ = -0.665, p<0.001). However, this correlation was positive for players in the highest contributors-quartile (ρ = 0.254, p<0.001). Therefore, the graph of relation between the contribution given and punishment obtained was U-shaped (R2 = 0.678, p<0.001) with the inflection point near the left boarder of the upper quartile. The antisocial punishment was present in all groups, and in eight out of ten groups the Justine Effect (the positive correlation between the contribution to the public pool and the risk of suffering punishment in the subpopulation of altruistic players) emerged. In our sample, 22.5% subjects, all of them Free riders and low contributors, punished the altruistic players. CONCLUSIONS: The results of our experimental game-study revealed the existence of the Justine effect--the positive correlation between the contribution to the public pool by a subpopulation of the most altruistic players, and the amount of punishment these players obtained from free-riders.
References provided by Crossref.org
- 000
- 00000naa a2200000 a 4500
- 001
- bmc16000781
- 003
- CZ-PrNML
- 005
- 20200630131502.0
- 007
- ta
- 008
- 160108s2014 xxu f 000 0|eng||
- 009
- AR
- 024 7_
- $a 10.1371/journal.pone.0092336 $2 doi
- 035 __
- $a (PubMed)24670974
- 040 __
- $a ABA008 $b cze $d ABA008 $e AACR2
- 041 0_
- $a eng
- 044 __
- $a xxu
- 100 1_
- $a Kuběna, Aleš $u Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. $7 xx0108674
- 245 10
- $a Justine effect: punishment of the unduly self-sacrificing cooperative individuals / $c AA. Kuběna, P. Houdek, J. Lindová, L. Příplatová, J. Flegr,
- 520 9_
- $a BACKGROUND: Allowing players to punish their opponents in Public Goods Game sustains cooperation within a group and thus brings advantage to the cooperative individuals. However, the possibility of punishment of the co-players can result in antisocial punishment, the punishment of those players who contribute the most in the group. To better understand why antisocial punishment exists, it must be determined who are the anti-social punishers and who are their primary targets. METHODS: For resolving these questions we increased the number of players in a group from usual four to twelve. Each group played six rounds of the standard Public Goods Game and six rounds of the Public Goods Game with punishment. Each player in each round received 20 CZK ($ 1.25). Players (N = 118) were rematched after each round so that they would not take into consideration opponents' past behavior. RESULTS: The amount of the punishment received correlated negatively with the contribution (ρ = -0.665, p<0.001). However, this correlation was positive for players in the highest contributors-quartile (ρ = 0.254, p<0.001). Therefore, the graph of relation between the contribution given and punishment obtained was U-shaped (R2 = 0.678, p<0.001) with the inflection point near the left boarder of the upper quartile. The antisocial punishment was present in all groups, and in eight out of ten groups the Justine Effect (the positive correlation between the contribution to the public pool and the risk of suffering punishment in the subpopulation of altruistic players) emerged. In our sample, 22.5% subjects, all of them Free riders and low contributors, punished the altruistic players. CONCLUSIONS: The results of our experimental game-study revealed the existence of the Justine effect--the positive correlation between the contribution to the public pool by a subpopulation of the most altruistic players, and the amount of punishment these players obtained from free-riders.
- 650 12
- $a altruismus $7 D000533
- 650 12
- $a kooperační chování $7 D003299
- 650 _2
- $a teorie her $7 D005716
- 650 _2
- $a lidé $7 D006801
- 650 12
- $a trest $7 D011678
- 650 12
- $a sociální spravedlnost $7 D012935
- 655 _2
- $a časopisecké články $7 D016428
- 655 _2
- $a práce podpořená grantem $7 D013485
- 700 1_
- $a Houdek, Petr $u Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic; Department of Economics, Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, J. E. Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem, Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic.
- 700 1_
- $a Lindová, Jitka $u Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.
- 700 1_
- $a Příplatová, Lenka $u Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.
- 700 1_
- $a Flegr, Jaroslav $u Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.
- 773 0_
- $w MED00180950 $t PloS one $x 1932-6203 $g Roč. 9, č. 3 (2014), s. e92336
- 856 41
- $u https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24670974 $y Pubmed
- 910 __
- $a ABA008 $b sig $c sign $y a $z 0
- 990 __
- $a 20160108 $b ABA008
- 991 __
- $a 20200630131459 $b ABA008
- 999 __
- $a ok $b bmc $g 1103062 $s 924987
- BAS __
- $a 3
- BAS __
- $a PreBMC
- BMC __
- $a 2014 $b 9 $c 3 $d e92336 $e 20140326 $i 1932-6203 $m PLoS One $n PLoS One $x MED00180950
- LZP __
- $a Pubmed-20160108