The aim of this perspective article is to show that current experimental evidence on factors influencing dishonesty has limited external validity. Most of experimental studies is built on random assignments, in which control/experimental groups of subjects face varied sizes of the expected reward for behaving dishonestly, opportunities for cheating, means of rationalizing dishonest behavior etc., and mean groups' reactions are observed. The studies have internal validity in assessing the causal influence of these and other factors, but they lack external validity in organizational, market and other environments. If people can opt into or out of diverse real-world environments, an experiment aimed at studying factors influencing real-life degree of dishonesty should permit for such an option. The behavior of such self-selected groups of marginal subjects would probably contain a larger level of (non)deception than the behavior of average people. The article warns that there are not many studies that would enable self-selection or sorting of participants into varying environments, and that limits current knowledge of the extent and dynamics of dishonest and fraudulent behavior. The article focuses on suggestions how to improve dishonesty research, especially how to avoid the experimenter demand bias.

Center for Behavioral ExperimentsPrague Czechia

Faculty of Business Administration University of Economics PraguePrague Czechia

Faculty of Social and Economic Studies Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad LabemÚstí nad Labem Czechia

Zobrazit více v PubMed

Abeler J., Becker A., Falk A. (2014). Representative evidence on lying costs. J. Public Econ. 113 96–104. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.005 DOI

Ayal S., Gino F., Barkan R., Ariely D. (2015). Three principles to REVISE people’s unethical behavior. Pers. Psychol. Sci. 10 738–741. 10.1177/1745691615598512 PubMed DOI

Azmat G., Möller M. (2009). Competition among contests. RAND J. Econ. 40 743–768. 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00087.x DOI

Banerjee R., Baul T., Rosenblat T. (2015). On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector. Econ. Lett. 127 43–46. 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.020 DOI

Barr A., Serra D. (2010). Corruption and culture: an experimental analysis. J. Public Econ. 94 862–869. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.006 DOI

Blanken I., van de Ven N., Zeelenberg M. (2015). A meta-analytic review of moral licensing. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 41 540–558. 10.1177/0146167215572134 PubMed DOI

Bless H., Burger A. M. (2016). A closer look at social psychologists’ silver bullet: inevitable and evitable side effects of the experimental approach. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 11 296–308. 10.1177/1745691615621278 PubMed DOI

Bohnet I., Kübler D. (2005). Compensating the cooperators: is sorting in the prisoner’s dilemma possible? J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 56 61–76. 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.04.002 DOI

Brekke K. A., Hauge K. E., Lind J. T., Nyborg K. (2011). Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation. J. Public Econ. 95 1111–1118. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.003 DOI

Bryan G., Karlan D., Nelson S. (2010). Commitment devices. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2 671–698. 10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124324 DOI

Bucciol A., Piovesan M. (2011). Luck or cheating? A field experiment on honesty with children. J. Econ. Psychol. 32 73–78. 10.1016/j.joep.2010.12.001 DOI

Burks S. V., Krupka E. L. (2012). A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy: evidence from the financial services industry. Manag. Sci. 58 203–217. 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1478 DOI

Cadsby C. B., Song F., Tapon F. (2007). Sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance: an experimental investigation. Acad. Manag. J. 50 387–405. 10.2307/20159860 DOI

Cohen T. R., Panter A. T., Turan N., Morse L., Kim Y. (2014). Moral character in the workplace. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 107 943–963. 10.1037/a0037245 PubMed DOI

Cornelissen G., Bashshur M. R., Rode J., Menestrel M. L. (2013). Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mind-sets in moral dynamics. Psychol. Sci. 24 482–488. 10.1177/0956797612457376 PubMed DOI

Dai Z., Galeotti F., Villeval M. C. (2017). Cheating in the lab predicts fraud in the field: an experiment in public transportation. Manag. Sci. 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2616 [Epub ahead of print]. DOI

Dana J., Cain D. M., Dawes R. M. (2006). What you don’t know won’t hurt me: costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 100 193–201. 10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.001 DOI

DeLeire T., Levy H. (2004). Worker sorting and the risk of death on the job. J. Labor Econ. 22 925–953. 10.1086/423159 DOI

DellaVigna S., List J. A., Malmendier U. (2012). Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. Q. J. Econ. 127 1–56. 10.1093/qje/qjr050 PubMed DOI

Desai S. D., Kouchaki M. (2017). Moral symbols: a necklace of garlic against unethical requests. Acad. Manag. J. 60 7–28. 10.5465/amj.2015.0008 DOI

Dohmen T., Falk A. (2011). Performance pay and multidimensional sorting: productivity, preferences, and gender. Am. Econ. Rev. 101 556–590. 10.1257/aer.101.2.556 DOI

Faravelli M., Friesen L., Gangadharan L. (2015). Selection, tournaments, and dishonesty. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 110 160–175. 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.019 DOI

Fehrler S., Kosfeld M. (2014). Pro-social missions and worker motivation: an experimental study. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 100 99–110. 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.010 DOI

Fischbacher U., Föllmi-Heusi F. (2013). Lies in disguise—an experimental study on cheating. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 11 525–547. 10.1111/jeea.12014 DOI

Fisman R., Miguel E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. J. Polit. Econ. 115 1020–1048. 10.1086/527495 DOI

Gächter S., Schulz J. F. (2016). Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies. Nature 531 496–499. 10.1038/nature17160 PubMed DOI PMC

Garrett J., Hoitash R., Prawitt D. F. (2014). Trust and financial reporting quality. J. Account. Res. 52 1087–1125. 10.1111/1475-679x.12063 DOI

Garrett N., Lazzaro S. C., Ariely D., Sharot T. (2016). The brain adapts to dishonesty. Nat. Neurosci. 19 1727–1732. 10.1038/nn.4426 PubMed DOI PMC

Gino F., Ayal S., Ariely D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: the effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychol. Sci. 20 393–398. 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02306.x PubMed DOI

Gino F., Krupka E. L., Weber R. A. (2013). License to cheat: voluntary regulation and ethical behavior. Manag. Sci. 59 2187–2203. 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1699 DOI

Grieser W. D., Kapadia N., Li R., Simonov A. (2016). Fifty Shades of Corporate Culture. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2741049

Griffin J. M., Kruger S. A., Maturana G. (2016). Do Personal Ethics Influence Corporate Ethics? Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2745062

Gunia B. C., Levine E. E. (2016). Deception as competence: the effect of occupation on ethical judgment and behavior. Acad. Manag. Proc. 2016:10780 10.5465/AMBPP.2016.10780abstract DOI

Hanna R., Wang S.-Y. (2017). Dishonesty and selection into public service: evidence from India. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 9 262–290. 10.1257/pol.20150029 DOI

Henrich J., Heine S. J., Norenzayan A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behav. Brain Sci. 33 61–83. 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X PubMed DOI

Houdek P. (2017a). Professional identity and dishonest behavior. Society 54 253–260. 10.1007/s12115-017-0132-y DOI

Houdek P. (2017b). Is behavioral ethics ready for giving business and policy advice? J. Manag. Inq. 10.1177/1056492617712894 DOI

Houser D., Vetter S., Winter J. (2012). Fairness and cheating. Eur. Econ. Rev. 56 1645–1655. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.08.001 DOI

Irlenbusch B., Villeval M. C. (2015). Behavioral ethics: how psychology influenced economics and how economics might inform psychology? Curr. Opin. Psychol. 6 87–92. 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.04.004 DOI

Jacobsen C., Fosgaard T. R., Pascual-Ezama D. (2017). Why do we lie? A practical guide to the dishonesty literature. J. Econ. Surv. 10.1111/joes.12204 [Epub ahead of print]. DOI

Jiang T. (2013). Cheating in mind games: the subtlety of rules matters. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 93 328–336. 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.003 DOI

John K., Thomsen S. L. (2014). Heterogeneous returns to personality: the role of occupational choice. Empir. Econ. 47 553–592. 10.1007/s00181-013-0756-8 DOI

Karpoff J. M., Lee D. S., Martin G. S. (2017). Foreign Bribery: Incentives and Enforcement. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract= 1573222

Krueger A. B., Schkade D. (2008). Sorting in the labor market: do gregarious workers flock to interactive jobs? J. Hum. Res. 43 859–883. 10.3368/jhr.43.4.859 DOI

Lazear E. P., Malmendier U., Weber R. A. (2012). Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences. Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ. 4 136–163. 10.1257/app.4.1.136 DOI

Leeson P. T. (2009). The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Leuven E., Oosterbeek H., Sonnemans J., van der Klaauw B. (2011). Incentives versus sorting in tournaments: evidence from a field experiment. J. Lab. Econ. 29 637–658. 10.1086/659345 DOI

Levine R., Rubinstein Y. (2017). Smart and illicit: who becomes an entrepreneur and do they earn more? Q. J. Econ. 132 963–1018. 10.1093/qje/qjw044 DOI

Levine T. R., Kim R. K., Hamel L. M. (2010). People lie for a reason: three experiments documenting the principle of veracity. Commun. Res. Rep. 27 271–285. 10.1080/08824096.2010.496334 DOI

Levitt S. D., List J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? J. Econ. Perspect. 21 153–174. 10.1257/jep.21.2.153 DOI

Lewis A., Bardis A., Flint C., Mason C., Smith N., Tickle C., et al. (2012). Drawing the line somewhere: an experimental study of moral compromise. J. Econ. Psychol. 33 718–725. 10.1016/j.joep.2012.01.005 DOI

Maréchal M. A., Cohn A., Ugazio G., Ruff C. C. (2017). Increasing honesty in humans with noninvasive brain stimulation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 114 4360–4364. 10.1073/pnas.1614912114 PubMed DOI PMC

Mazar N., Amir O., Ariely D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: a theory of self-concept maintenance. J. Mark. Res. 45 633–644. 10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633 DOI

Mironov M. (2015). Should one hire a corrupt CEO in a corrupt country? J. Financ. Econ. 117 29–42. 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.03.002 DOI

Niederle M., Vesterlund L. (2007). Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too much? Q. J. Econ. 122 1067–1101. 10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067 DOI

Novakova J., Houdek P., Jolič J., Flegr J. (2017). Experimental assessment of cheating prevalence in the Czech Republic as an example of a post-communist country. Deviant Behav. (in press).

Orbell J. M., Dawes R. M. (1993). Social welfare, cooperators’ advantage, and the option of not playing the game. Am. Sociol. Rev. 58 787–800. 10.2307/2095951 DOI

Pierce L., Balasubramanian P. (2015). Behavioral field evidence on psychological and social factors in dishonesty and misconduct. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 6 70–76. 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.04.002 DOI

Potters J., Stoop J. (2016). Do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field? Eur Econ. Rev. 87 26–33. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.004 DOI

Rosenbaum S. M., Billinger S., Stieglitz N. (2014). Let’s be honest: a review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling. J. Econ. Psychol. 45 181–196. 10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.002 DOI

Schweitzer M. E., Ordóñez L., Douma B. (2004). Goal Setting as a motivator of unethical behavior. Acad. Manag. J. 47 422–432. 10.2307/20159591 DOI

Shalvi S., Dana J., Handgraaf M. J. J., De Dreu C. K. W. (2011). Justified ethicality: observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior. Organ. Behav. Hum. Dec. Process. 115 181–190. 10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.02.001 DOI

Shalvi S., Gino F., Barkan R., Ayal S. (2015). Self-serving justifications: doing wrong and feeling moral. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 24 125–130. 10.1177/0963721414553264 DOI

Skarbek D. (2014). The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199328499.001.0001 DOI

Treviño L. K., Weaver G. R., Reynolds S. J. (2006). Behavioral ethics in organizations: a review. J. Manag. 32 951–990. 10.1177/0149206306294258 DOI

Vranka M. A., Houdek P. (2015). Many faces of Bankers’ identity: how (not) to study dishonesty. Front. Psychol. 6:302 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00302 PubMed DOI PMC

Weisel O., Shalvi S. (2015). The collaborative roots of corruption. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 112 10651–10656. 10.1073/pnas.1423035112 PubMed DOI PMC

Zeume S. (2016). Bribes and firm value. Rev. Financ. Stud. 30 1457–1489. 10.1093/rfs/hhw108 DOI

Zhang T., Gino F., Bazerman M. H. (2014). Morality rebooted: exploring simple fixes to our moral bugs. Res. Organ. Behav. 34 63–79. 10.1016/j.riob.2014.10.002 DOI

Zhou H., Fishbach A. (2016). The pitfall of experimenting on the web: how unattended selective attrition leads to surprising (yet false) research conclusions. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 111 493–504. 10.1037/pspa0000056 PubMed DOI

Zitzewitz E. (2012). Forensic economics. J. Econ. Literat. 50 731–769. 10.1257/jel.50.3.731 DOI

Zizzo D. J. (2010). Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments. Exp. Econ. 13 75–98. 10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z DOI

Fraud and Understanding the Moral Mind: Need for Implementation of Organizational Characteristics into Behavioral Ethics