What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review
Status PubMed-not-MEDLINE Jazyk angličtina Země Švýcarsko Médium electronic-ecollection
Typ dokumentu časopisecké články, přehledy
PubMed
38966739
PubMed Central
PMC11222411
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430262
Knihovny.cz E-zdroje
- Klíčová slova
- complexity measures, consciousness, dimensionality, dimensions of consciousness, global state, multidimensional phenomenon, multidimensional properties, structure of consciousness,
- Publikační typ
- časopisecké články MeSH
- přehledy MeSH
A recent development in the psychological and neuroscientific study of consciousness has been the tendency to conceptualize consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon. This narrative review elucidates the notion of dimensionality of consciousness and outlines the key concepts and disagreements on this topic through the viewpoints of several theoretical proposals. The reviewed literature is critically evaluated, and the main issues to be resolved by future theoretical and empirical work are identified: the problems of dimension selection and dimension aggregation, as well as some ethical considerations. This narrative review is seemingly the first to comprehensively overview this specific aspect of consciousness science.
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