Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: A comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries
Jazyk angličtina Země Irsko Médium print-electronic
Typ dokumentu časopisecké články, přehledy
Grantová podpora
001
World Health Organization - International
PubMed
34711443
PubMed Central
PMC8492384
DOI
10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.09.015
PII: S0168-8510(21)00249-9
Knihovny.cz E-zdroje
- Klíčová slova
- COVID-19, Compensations, Economic incentives, Payment mechanisms,
- MeSH
- COVID-19 * MeSH
- lidé MeSH
- motivace MeSH
- pandemie MeSH
- poplatky a výdaje MeSH
- rozpočty MeSH
- Check Tag
- lidé MeSH
- Publikační typ
- časopisecké články MeSH
- přehledy MeSH
Provider payment mechanisms were adjusted in many countries in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Our objective was to review adjustments for hospitals and healthcare professionals across 20 countries. We developed an analytical framework distinguishing between payment adjustments compensating income loss and those covering extra costs related to COVID-19. Information was extracted from the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor (HSRM) and classified according to the framework. We found that income loss was not a problem in countries where professionals were paid by salary or capitation and hospitals received global budgets. In countries where payment was based on activity, income loss was compensated through budgets and higher fees. New FFS payments were introduced to incentivize remote services. Payments for COVID-19 related costs included new fees for out- and inpatient services but also new PD and DRG tariffs for hospitals. Budgets covered the costs of adjusting wards, creating new (ICU) beds, and hiring staff. We conclude that public payers assumed most of the COVID-19-related financial risk. In view of future pandemics policymakers should work to increase resilience of payment systems by: (1) having systems in place to rapidly adjust payment systems; (2) being aware of the economic incentives created by these adjustments such as cost-containment or increasing the number of patients or services, that can result in unintended consequences such as risk selection or overprovision of care; and (3) periodically evaluating the effects of payment adjustments on access and quality of care.
Belgian Health Care Knowledge Centre Belgium
Center for Social and Economic Strategies Faculty of Social Science Charles University Czechia
Data Sciences for Health Services and Policy Research Institute for Health Sciences in Aragon Spain
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies Belgium
Faculty of Public Health Medical University Varna Bulgaria
Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare and Tampere University Faculty of Social Sciences Finland
Institute for Research and Information in Health Economics France
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine London UK
National School of Public Health Management and Professional Development Bucharest Romania
Netherlands Institute of Health Services Research Utrecht the Netherlands
Swedish Agency for Health and Care Services Analysis
Tampere University Faculty of Social Sciences Finland
University of Lucerne Department of Health Sciences and Medicine Switzerland
Zobrazit více v PubMed
World Health Organization.Regional Office for Europe, “Strengthening the health systems response to COVID-19: policy brief: recommendations for the WHO European Region,” Apr. 2020.
“Data on hospital and ICU admission rates and current occupancy for COVID-19,” European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Apr. 15, 2021. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/download-data-hospital-and-icu-admission-rates-and-current-occupancy-covid-19 (accessed Apr. 19, 2021).
Technishce Universitat Berlin, Department of Health Care Management, “COVID-19: database on patients treated as inpatients and in hospitals in 31 European countries - updated monthly,” Faculty VII Economics & Management: current information. https://www.tu-berlin.de/?49992 (accessed Apr. 19, 2021).
“COVID-19 health system response monitor.” https://www.covid19healthsystem.org/mainpage.aspx (accessed May 04, 2021).
Webb E., Hernández-Quevedo C., Williams G., Scarpetti G., Reed S., Panteli D. Providing health services effectively during the first wave of COVID-19: a cross-country comparison on planning services, managing cases, and maintaining essential services. Health Policy. 2021 doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.04.016. May. PubMed DOI PMC
Gandjour A. How many intensive care beds are justifiable for hospital pandemic preparedness? A cost-effectiveness analysis for COVID-19 in Germany. Appl Health Econ Health Policy. 2021;19(Mar. (2)):181–190. doi: 10.1007/s40258-020-00632-2. PubMed DOI PMC
Quentin W., et al. Adjusting hospital inpatient payment systems for COVID-19 health system assessment view project EuroDRG view project 88 paying for services adjusting hospital inpatient payment systems for COVID-19. EuroHealth. 2020;26(2):88–92.
Waitzberg R., et al. Compensating healthcare professionals for income losses and extra expenses during COVID-19. Eurohealth. 2020;26(2):83–87.
Robinson J.C. Theory and practice in the design of physician payment incentives. Milbank Q. 2001;79(Jun. (2)):149–177. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.00202. PubMed DOI PMC
Ellis Randal, Miller Michelle McKinnon. In: Health Systems Policy, Finance, and Organization, 1st ed., vol. 3. Guy Carrin Kent Buse, Heggenhougen Kristian, Quah Stella R., editors. Academic Press; Amsterdam: 2009. Provider payment and incentives.
Cots F., Chiarello P., Salvador X., Castells X., Quentin W. In: Diagnosis-related groups in Europe: moving towards transparency, efficiency and quality in hospitals. Busse R., Geissler A., Quentin W., Wiley M., editors. Open University Press and WHO Regional Office for Europe; Buckingham: 2011. DRG-based hospital payment: intended and unintended consequences; pp. 75–92.
Rechel B., Maresso A., Van Ginneken E. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies; Copenhagen: 2010. Health systems in transition - template for authors.
S. Thomson, T. Habicht, and T. Evetovits, “How are countries mobilizing additional public funds for health?,” Apr. 2020. Accessed: Aug. 19, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://eurohealthobservatory.who.int/monitors/hsrm/analyses/hsrm/how-are-countries-mobilizing-additional-public-funds-for-health.
R.P. Ellis and T.G. Mcguire, “Hospital response to prospective payment: moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects,” 1996. PubMed
Newhouse J.P. Reimbursing health plans and health providers: efficiency in production versus selection. J Econ Lit. 1996;34(3):1236–1263.
Jegers M., Kesteloot K., De Graeve D., Gilles W. A typology for provider payment systems in health care. Health Policy. 2002;60(Jun. (3)):255–273. doi: 10.1016/S0168-8510(01)00216-0. PubMed DOI
OECD . OECD Publishing; Paris: 2016. Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, OECD Health Policy Studies. DOI
Ellis R.P., Martins B., Miller M.M. In: International encyclopedia of public health. Heggenhougen S.R., Quah H.K., editors. 2015. Provider payment methods and incentives.
Quinn K. The 8 basic payment methods in health care. Ann Intern Med. 2015;163(Aug. (4)):300. doi: 10.7326/M14-2784. PubMed DOI
Ellis R.P., McGuire T.G. Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in health care. J Econ Perspect. 1993;7(4):135–151. doi: 10.1257/jep.7.4.135. PubMed DOI
Ellis R.P. Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins. J Health Econ. 1998;17(Oct. (5)):537–555. doi: 10.1016/S0167-6296(97)00042-8. PubMed DOI
Van Barneveld E.M., Lamers L.M., Van Vliet R.C.J.A., Van De Ven W.P.M.M. Risk sharing as a supplement to imperfect capitation: a tradeoff between selection and efficiency. J Health Econ. 2001;20(Mar. (2)):147–168. doi: 10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00077-1. PubMed DOI
Waitzberg R., Quentin W., Webb E., Glied S. The structure and financing of health care systems affected how providers coped with COVID-19. Milbank Q. 2021;99(Jun. (2)):542–564. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.12530. PubMed DOI PMC
Quentin W., et al. Paying hospital specialists: experiences and lessons from eight high-income countries. Health Policy. 2018;122(May (5)):473–484. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2018.03.005. PubMed DOI